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D
evelopment assistance organizations are paying
greater attention to the causes of conflict, asserting
a link between poverty and violence and affirming
the potential of designing more conflict prevention sensitive
development policies and programs. The Liu Centre for the
Study of Global Issues at the University of British Columbia
and the Canadian International Development Agency re-
cently hosted the Vancouver Roundtable on Development,
Conflict and Peacebuilding: Responding to the Challenge,
on February 14–15, 2002, where invited experts explored the
possibilities of linking development and conflict prevention
more effectively. Noted for his extensive field experience in
following up the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace
and Development in 1999, as well as recent articles in 2001
and 2002 and a book in 1998 on the role of the international
development agencies in Rwanda, invited Roundtable par-
ticipant Professor Peter Uvin of Tufts University agreed to
be interviewed by IIR Liu Centre post-doctoral fellow Erin
Baines to elaborate his framework for taking action, pre-
sented at the Vancouver Roundtable.
Given that each conflict situation is “too different, too unique,
too idiosyncratic to generalize across cases,” as you wrote in
“Some Reflections of Good Donor Practice,” what can we
expect from a Canadian strategic response to the issue of
development and conflict prevention?
There are seven features that characterize a good policy on
development and conflict prevention. These seven features
are relevant for non-conflict prevention related develop-
ment work as well. They hold for all development work,
suggesting that there is nothing unique about conflict pre-
vention work. Now it would be interesting to tease out what
would be specific only to development trying to prevent
conflict, as opposed to development just doing develop-
ment. But do such situations exist?
I do not believe you can come to very meaningful and
strong predictors about violent conflict or what you can do
to prevent violent conflict. All you can do is ask the right
questions and set up mechanisms and lenses that allow you
to constantly be aware and adapt.
Some of these seven features are widely accepted, while
some are widely non-accepted, or non-practiced. First, you
have to be prevention-oriented as a matter of total routine;
it ought to be so ordinary that you do not need to talk about
it any more. For example, it is now expected that, if you
were to do anything in development and you totally disre-
gard gender issues or poverty issues, people will ask you
…"what decade are you coming from?" This ought to be the
case with conflict. This is both a relatively easy one, for it
requires little money and time, and a very hard one, for it
is at this level that much resistance exists.
Second, you have to be knowledge based; you will
never be able to deal intelligently with conflict dynamics
without good knowledge. I think that is widely accepted.
The question is whose knowledge counts, which is a very
important and totally undervalued matter. We have to
put vastly more resources into local knowledge genera-
tion. But I think that is the case also for non-conflict
development work.
You have to always invest in local knowledge creation to
ensure that there are strong and existing dynamics for
intellectual reflection and speaking out about conflict issues
once they force themselves onto the agenda. This is one
thing that foreign aid can do better than others, to create
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the kind of spaces for people to do this, because in [cases of
violence] these spaces often do not exist or are weak. So that
is something that could be done better….
Third, we ought to be more flexible in financial mecha-
nisms and administrative mechanisms, capable of making
short-term change with a long-term perspective. We typically
do not have much of a long-term perspective. At the same
time, we aren’t very good at the short term either, wherein
overnight or in the course of a week we can dramatically
change course. So, our focus needs to be shorter and longer at
the same time. That’s tough, but not inconceivable, and there
are mechanisms that exist already; there just need to be more.
Fourth, your aid machinery needs to be light, and based
on what exists internally. This is not simply the old “part-
nership” or participation approach. We need a much
stronger way of working that supplements or complements
people’s own actions but never substitutes for them. That
is a difficult rule to live by, because there is so much need
out there, and consequently so much temptation to just do
something. Also, we tend to be deeply invested in what we
do. I am confronted with it myself because I am developing
for some donor a project in Rwanda to support the gacaca
process.1 This project is my baby. I convinced people to
fund it. But it has been difficult and time-consuming to hire
Rwandans to run the project. The job may be too outspo-
ken, too dangerous, too hard, too narrow, they are not
impartial, and so on. But should we do a project if we
cannot find Rwandans ready to carry it? Should we substi-
tute for local effort? I tend to think not: we should only do
it if they are doing it already. That would be my normal
position in normal development circumstances. Could we
make the case that conflict situations are particular? Given
the danger for local people and our comparative advantage
in creating space and extending protection to people who
speak beyond the limited discourses that prevail during
periods of violent conflict, we maybe should make some
exceptions to the rule that we don’t substitute. Foreigners
are not Hutu or Tutsi, they are not subject to the same
pressure, they are not so afraid, they do not have family or
bear the psychosocial trauma around this, so here is a case
to relax the rule. Still, one should have a very clear vision
about how to minimize the role of the foreigners, and to
ensure you promote a maximum of local and not foreign
knowledge on Rwanda, because that is what Rwandans are
lacking. More  than food, more than anything, they are
lacking space to conceive their future. So the basic rule still
holds, even in an extreme case like Rwanda, that we need
to create procedures and processes that are more likely to
promote and engage local knowledge.
Fifth, we need to be more principled, which brings us to
human rights, which are more or less the only principles
that are universally accepted. Attention to a human-rights
based approach to development, which isn’t about writing
legal statements or creating commissions, but about insti-
tuting social practices that lead to enforceable rights.
Sixth, we need to become more self-critical. We must
look at ourselves and our funding and behaviour patterns
in terms of how they affect dynamics of violence or exclu-
sion or structural violence, or human rights violations. If
we cannot solve all these matters, we should at least try to
do less harm.
Finally, we need to be more coherent. We need more
coordination without giving up local capacities to make
choices and to be in charge. It might be possible for some
donor countries or agencies to occasionally create projects
that seek to facilitate coordination or to pay the cost of
coordination by setting up investment in knowledge crea-
tion, facilitation, negotiation, and so on, simply with the
aim of creating dynamics where the total would be more
than the sum of the parts. In the development business,
almost systematically, the total is less than the sum of the
parts. If we could just create means to change that, we could
do so much more.
The OECD calls this “innovation in diversity.” For ex-
ample, some programs are going much further in terms of
engaging people, taking more risks and being more willing
to support innovative initiatives. Other donors could sim-
ply co-fund these. Joint evaluations are another possibility,
where agencies try to learn together, potentially also doing
joint identifications, even if they cannot get to joint actions.
When was the last time you were surprised by an international
response or action regarding conflict prevention or peacebuild-
ing? How much hope do you hold out for the international
community to adopt this “package”?
It is simply doing certain things better, new tools and better
knowledge management.  Agencies like  DFID and  CIDA
have made significant progress in thinking through all this.
Some things go much further, I agree, such as losing our
power, to not substitute, to make ethical and operational
choices based on information from local people.
I am trying to think of the last time I was surprised. I am
often surprised by inaction; by people I know personally
and I know what they think and yet they still don’t manage
to do what they know is necessary. I have never been a
senior policy maker so I don’t really know what it feels like;
I have been a guy in the field and I know what that feels like.
When you hang out with senior policy makers, you see that
they are greatly constrained; even if they are deeply com-
mitted to any part of the “package” they are typically so
overworked, running from one crisis to another. Anything
that is not a crisis is basically not going to make it onto their
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agenda; by the time it does so, you have lost the capacity to
do much of what we were talking about, it seems, and thus
standard approaches are applied. So, I have been surprised
by the sameness in response. Private corporations seem to
have better ways of dealing with the challenge of change.
In the case of Rwanda, you suggest in “Difficult Choices in the
New Post-Conflict Agenda” that very divergent interpreta-
tions of the nature of the RPF-dominated government guide
donor policy and programs, often with incoherent results and
bypassing difficult ethical questions. Why do Western donors
fall into such binary camps in this case? Is there a grey area for
interpretation?
There is a part in the article that I cut out for lack of space.
According to me, in a case like Rwanda, it is actually both
sides that are right. It’s not “either/or,” but “both/and.” The
Rwandan government can be both deeply committed to a
future in which ethnicity doesn’t matter any more and at the
same time deeply distrustful of the other ethnic group. It can
be committed to a vision of democratic involvement, and
yet want to hold onto power at all costs. It can be deeply free
market and liberal oriented, and yet do everything possible
to ensure that no independent private sector emerges. These
things seem to hold simultaneously. Real life, especially after
violent conflict, is nothing but grey zones.
You could also argue that most donors act in a similar
grey manner: even though they interpret and think about
the situation in quite strong terms, the practice of diplo-
macy favours not rocking the boat. Being radical is not how
you do diplomacy. Diplomats don’t really speak out very
loudly even though behind closed doors they tell you they
are totally distressed with the government. So in practice
most play in grey areas…but not because this is a conscious
strategy to deal with the dualistic nature of reality, but
rather because that is how you do diplomacy. So, can you
as a donor work in the grey zone, based on a fine under-
standing of the way black and white mix to become grey,
rather than as a simple result of the fact that diplomacy is
all based on grey suits? That clearly is not easy, because on
what ethical basis are you going to enter the grey zones and
make judgments and set goals?
If you want to go grey, you must ask those whose lives
are affected by it. Ask them vastly more. Think of villagiza-
tion in Rwanda. For years, people in the international
community had strong feelings on the matter. Some donors
were deeply opposed to it, while others were willing to
support it, but hesitantly. In response, most dragged their
feet, so they did the grey thing. As far as I know, it took
more than two years for the first organization to actually
ask farmers what they thought about villagization policy
themselves. Oxfam and also a Dutch group ended up doing
this, a fascinating piece of work. What came out of that was
much more “in between”: Rwandans were neither totally
opposed to it, nor totally in favour of it. It depended on
their own personal trajectories, their own sense of security
risks, and especially the process by which the policy was
implemented. It took much too long before this “voice”
came to be represented at the table. Again, this gets back to
knowledge creation. We need to do vastly more listening,
feeding it directly and unfiltered up to policy – our own and
other actors’. And the donor can play a role there; we don’t
expect small farmers to go to the office of the President and
make a good point. But you can do it yourself as a foreigner.
So do it.
In “Difficult Choices,” you made the argument that “the new
post-conflict agenda … amounts to a licence for intervention
so deep and unchecked it resembles colonialism…” On the
other hand, you do not advocate pulling out, but rather a
number of areas donor could improve, resembling “the pack-
age” proposed above – knowledge, flexibility, consultation,
substance, coherence. If this occurred, would neo-colonialism
be averted? Does it increase control or decentralize?
In some ways, a lot of the coherence and post-conflict
discourse does sound like we are saying, “How can we gang
up better on Third World governments?” – by making a
united front, with no crack, as if everything is our business.
Two points. One, to some extent, there is a reason to gang
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up in this world. There actually are an awful lot of govern-
ments and  people  in governments  that  deserve a  lot  of
ganging up on. They use violence, abuse, killing, stealing,
lying, and so, and I see little in the name of sovereignty,
partnership, and respect that could justify our complicity
with that. So I don’t mind ganging up a little bit.
On the other hand, it is true, for change to be more
sustainable, it can’t come from outside. I think the seven
points I described are a way to avoid this kind of problem
– especially the ones that evoke the most silence when I raise
them, such as the “whose knowledge?” point and the “never
substitute” one. It is true, if you do five out of seven but not
those two, then we miss the crucial parts. Would that still
be better than current practice? Would principled ganging
up still be better than unprincipled ganging up?
Note
1. Gacaca is a form of traditional participative popular justice at
the local level that allows Rwandans to bring to trial those
accused of participation in the 1994 genocide.
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